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Abstract
Reading about another person’s beliefs engages ‘Theory of Mind’ processes and elicits highly reliable brain activation across
individuals and experimental paradigms. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined activation during a
story task designed to elicit Theory of Mind processing in a very large sample of neurotypical (N=462) individuals, and a
group of high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders (N=31), using both region-of-interest and whole-
brain analyses. This large sample allowed us to investigate group differences in brain activation to Theory of Mind tasks with
unusually high sensitivity. There were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder. These results imply that the social cognitive impairments typical of autism spectrum disorder can occur
without measurable changes in the size, location or response magnitude of activity during explicit Theory of Mind tasks
administered to adults.
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Introduction
Theory of Mind (‘ToM’) is the capacity to represent mental
states, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, feelings, plans, suspicions
and doubts [1]. Consideration of others’ mental states helps people
in many everyday activities: teaching, flirting, coordinating and
cooperating, playing games, conducting minor and massive
deceptions, making moral judgments and appreciating fiction.
Individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have impaired
ToM. For example, children with ASD are disproportionately
delayed on tasks that tap inferences about other people’s beliefs
[2]. The neural mechanism of this impairment remains unknown.
However, in neurotypical (NT) adults and children, fMRI studies
reveal a remarkably reliable group of brain regions recruited
during a ToM task of belief reasoning [3–9]. These regions include
the left and right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ),
right anterior superior temporal sulcus (rSTS), the medial
precuneus (PC), and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC).
Previous authors have suggested that ToM impairments in ASD
could be caused by impaired function in the brain regions typically
involved in ToM [10–13]. Attempts to characterize the function of
these ToM-relevant brain regions in adults with ASD have yielded
conflicting results, however. Some studies suggest that activations
in ToM regions show no difference between ASD and NT
individuals [14,15]. Others find reduced activity (i.e. hypo-activity)
[13,16], or the opposite pattern, hyper-activity, in ASD [17,18],
while still others find evidence of all three patterns depending on
the specific task demands [16,19].
One factor contributing to these conflicting results may be that
sample sizes are small, and individual variability is large. Small
samples of individuals with ASD are problematic because
individuals with ASD may be highly heterogeneous in their neural
responses (e.g., [20]). Small samples of NT individuals are equally
problematic, because they allow for calculation of only the mean of
the typical response, not its distribution. Understanding the typical
distribution is critical if neural measures are to be useful in a
clinical or diagnostic setting. For most clinical applications, it is less
important to describe differences between groups of individuals
(e.g. studies of this nature have an average of 14 adults with ASD
vs. 14 NT adults [13]), and more important to be able to describe
the neural activity pattern of each specific individual, relative to
typical and atypical distributions. For example, using fMRI to help
diagnose an individual with ASD would require comparing each
individual to the typical distribution.
In the current study, we therefore aggregated data collected
over 8 years from 462 NT participants. This large sample allowed
us to investigate individual differences in neural responses to a
belief-reasoning ToM task, and measure any difference between
NT participants and high-functioning adults with ASD with
unusually high sensitivity. We also tested whether the response of
ToM regions in NT individuals is related to basic demographic
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e75468factors that may be relevant for ASD, including gender, age, and
IQ.
Methods
All studies whose data are used in the current paper were
reviewed and approved by the MIT IRB, the Committee on the
Use of Human Experimental Subjects. Participants provided
written, informed consent, in accordance with the guidelines of the
MIT Committee on the Use of Human Experimental Subjects,
and were compensated monetarily for their time.
Typical Participants
Data were analyzed from 462 NT participants (mean=24.9
years, range: 18–69 years; 223 male). IQ was measured in 61 of
these participants using the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test
(KBIT-2, IQ mean=117.2, range: 82–134, SD=12.2). NT
Participants are summarized in Table 1.
ASD Participants
31 participants with a clinical diagnosis of ASD (mean=32.5
years, range: 18–66 years; 26 male) were included in this analysis,
having volunteered to participate in one of three previous studies
[21–23]. In addition to a clinical diagnosis of ASD, the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) was administered
(ADOS communication score mean=3.2, SD=1.3; ADOS social
score M=5.9, SD=2.1). Each ASD participants had a combined
social and communicative score .=7 (the criterion for inclusion
in the study). IQ was measured for all but one male participant
with ASD (KBIT-2, IQ mean=116.8, 69–141, SD=15.7). In
previous studies in our lab, these participants were found to have
significant behavioral deficits in ToM [21,22] in a moral judgment
task.
For direct NT vs. ASD comparison, a set of 27 NT participants
were chosen based on pairwise match with 27 ASD participants on
IQ (610 points), age (65 years), and gender. The pairs were also
matched on all experimental parameters (e.g. the coil used, the TR
and slice thickness, the modality of the stimuli, the number of
stimuli per condition, the presentation duration of the stimuli, and
the task the participant performed) (Note several of the ASD
participants were excluded since they could not be matched to a
specific NT participant). These samples each contained 22 males,
and were matched on age (ASD mean age=31.0 years, range 18–
66, SD=11.5; NT mean age=30.6 years, range 19–50, SD=9.3)
and IQ (ASD mean IQ=117.9, 90–141, SD=12.7; NT mean
IQ=115.1, 83–133, SD=12.2); these 54 participants were termed
the ‘matched’ sample.
fMRI Tasks
All participants were presented with verbal stories in English
that described a character who acquired a false belief (Belief
condition) or a physical representation that became false, such as
an outdated photograph or map (Photo condition). For example,
one Belief story was: ‘‘The morning of high school dance Sarah
placed her high heel shoes under her dress and then went
shopping. That afternoon, her sister borrowed the shoes and later
put them under Sarah’s bed.’’ One sample Photo story was:
‘‘Sargent famously painted the south bank of the river in 1885. In
1910 a huge dam was built, flooding out the whole river basin,
killing the old forests. Now the whole area is under water.’’ (More
example stimuli are available at http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.
php).
Across conditions, the stories were matched for length (see
Table 2 for more details about the tasks). Each participant read or
heard an equal number of stories in the two conditions. Localizers
were designed to present between 10 and 16 stories per condition
to participants, though due to extenuating circumstances a small
number of participants were presented with as few as 5 stories per
condition while others saw as many as 24 (mean=13.2). The
stories were presented either visually as text on a screen (to 420
participants), or aurally through headphones (to 73 participants).
In separate blocks of the same experiment, 121 participants also
saw stimuli from other conditions (e.g. physical descriptions of
objects, lists of unconnected words) but those conditions were not
included in the current analyses. The duration of the stimulus
block corresponded, on average, to 0.47 seconds per word
(STD=0.06 s), followed by 10–12 seconds of rest (these values
were constant within each variant of the task, see Table 2). After
reading or hearing each story, participants performed one of three
tasks: true/false (TF, e.g. ‘‘In the painting the south bank of the
river is wooded. True/False’’, N=304), fill in the blank (FITB, e.g.
‘‘In the painting the south bank of the river is… Wooded/
Flooded’’, N=101), or word match-to-sample (MTS, e.g. in the
preceding story, did you read ‘‘Painted’’?, N=88). Task was held
constant within participant, but varied across participant. These
tasks correspond to the functional localizers used in previously
published studies [24–30].
fMRI Methods
Participants were scanned on a 3T Siemens scanner at the
Martinos Imaging Center at the McGovern Institute for Brain
Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. NT
participants were scanned between 2006 and 2013. ASD
participants were scanned between 2007 and 2013. Matched
NTs were scanned between 2007 and 2013. Functional data were
acquired using echo-planar-imaging with voxel size of
Table 1. Demographic Summary.
Group Name N N Male N ASD Mean Age Age Range Mean IQ IQ Range
Mean ADOS
COMM Mean ADOS SOC
NT 462 197 0 24.4 (7.4) 18–69
ASD 31 26 31 32.5 (12.4) 18–66 3.2 (1.3) 5.9 (2.1)
Matched–ASD 27 22 27 31 (11.5) 18–52 117.9 (12.7) 90–141 3.3 (1.2) 5.9 (2.2)
Matched–NT 27 22 0 30.6 (9.3) 18–50 115.1 (12.2) 82–133
IQ 91 59 30 28.6 (9.9) 18–66 117.1 (13.4) 69–141
The demographic information for the participant sample and relevant participant subsamples are presented, with standard deviation in parentheses. ADOS
COMM=ADOS communication score, ADOS SOC=ADOS social score.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.t001
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Slice thickness varied from 3.1 mm to 4.8 mm (mean 4.0 mm, SD
0.2 mm) Participants were scanned on either a 12-channel
(N=419) or a 32-channel receive coil (N=74), both Siemens
products. Data were analyzed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk) and in-house software. The data were realigned to account
for motion, smoothed with a 5 mm Gaussian smoothing kernel
and normalized to a standard template in Montreal Neurological
Institute space.
ROI Analyses
Seven functional ROIs from the ToM network were defined in
individual participants, using the contrast Belief.Photo, consistent
with previous literature (e.g. [4,6]): right and left temporoparietal
junction (RTPJ, LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), the dorsal, middle and
ventral components of MPFC (DMPFC, MMPFC and VMPFC)
and the right superior temporal sulcus (RSTS).
To identify individual functional ROIs, initial ‘‘hypothesis
spaces’’ for each of the 7 regions were defined based on group
random effects analysis and used as a guide to identify clusters of
activation representing the ROI in participants. To ensure
independence, the participants were split randomly into two
groups (first half N=247, second half N=246), and the hypothesis
space from one group’s random effects analyses was used to define
ROIs in the participants belonging to the other group. ASD
participants were evenly distributed between the two groups. The
hypothesis spaces consisted of all voxels contained in a continuous
cluster of suprathreshold voxels that include the region represen-
tative of the ROI. The ROI hypothesis spaces were approximately
spherical, except the RSTS which was elongated following the
sulcus. Averaged across both halves, the DMPFC comprised 1,185
voxels, all z.20 mm, centered at xyz coordinates (21 mm,
53 mm, 29 mm). The MMPFC comprised 1,094 voxels, between
z.0 mm and z,20 mm centered at (1 54 12). VMPFC comprised
774 voxels, all z,0 mm, at (1 50 212). The RSTS comprised
3,002 voxels, all z.6 mm, centered at (55 210 216). The RTPJ
comprised 2,812 voxels, all z.6 mm, centered at (54 252 23).
The LTPJ similarly compromised 2,444 voxels, all z.6m m
centered at (252 258 25). Finally, the PC hypothesis space
consisted of 3,339 voxels centered at (1–56 34). Average ROI
hypothesis spaces are available as binary images in the NIfTI-1 file
format at saxelab.mit.edu/hypothesis_spaces.zip.
Each participant’s contrast image (Belief.Photo) was masked
iteratively with the six hypothesis spaces. After each masking,
candidate voxels were identified within the hypothesis space–
where a voxel was a candidate if it was individually significant at
p,0.001 (uncorrected) and contiguous with at least 10 other voxels
significant at p,0.001. From this set of candidates, the voxel with
the peak T is selected, along with all other candidate voxels that
are contiguous with and not more than 9 mm from the peak.
From each ROI, five parameters were extracted: the size of the
ROI (number of voxels included), the mean T value across voxels
included in the ROI, and the x-, y-, and z-coordinate of the ROI’s
‘‘center of mass,’’ being the average position of ROI voxels
weighted by their T values. The presence or absence of an
identified ROI in each region was itself used as an additional
parameter.
The reliability of ROI parameters within participants was
assessed by split-half analysis. Two contrast images were defined,
one from even run data and another from odd run data, in each
participant. The correlation of the ROI even and odd parameter
values was measured across participants. Significance was
established by iteratively permuting (5000 permutations) the
even-half data across participants to generate an empirical ‘null’
distribution. We report individual differences as reliable if the true
pairing showed a higher correlation than 90% of the empirical null
distribution. (Note that since these analyses are based on half of the
data per subject, they are conservative estimates of the reliability of
individual differences measured based on the full dataset per
individual).
Next, we sought (i) to remove variance from the ROI
parameters associated with ‘nuisance’ demographic and experi-
mental variables to better reveal differences (if any) between ASD
and NT groups and (ii) to evaluate the effects (if any) of our
demographic and experimental variables on ROI parameters. To
both these ends, a multivariate Generalized Linear Model (GLM)
was constructed for each ROI parameter with a nine-column (age,
gender, group, modality, coil, number of stimuli per condition,
mean words per stimulus, task type and the intercept term)
predictor matrix using data from 493 (462 NT and 31 ASD)
participants (see Table 3). For the binary statistic that indicated
Table 2. Task Variants.
ID
Mean
Words
N Stimuli
Per Cond
Block
length (s)
Task
Type Modality
Included
Other
Conds N Subj N Male N ASD
Mean Age
(years)
N3 2
Channel
A 36 12 24 FITB V Y 33 22 18 33.03 0
B 57.9 12 38 MTS V Y 88 34 0 24.58 29
C 31.2 12 24 FITB V N 68 28 0 22.28 0
D 30.7 12 28 TF A N 65 35 9 30.12 0
E–A 30.5 16 28 TF A N 8 3 0 22.62 0
E–V 30.5 16 24–28 TF V N 167 72 1 22.9 0
F 31.0 10 24 TF V N 64 29 3 24.13 45
Overall 35.95 13.16 27.25 493 223 31 24.9 74
The data analyzed here are aggregated across seven variants of the Theory of Mind task. Although the conceptual contrast was constant (Belief.Photo), across
participants there was variation in the length and number of stimuli, the modality (V=visual, A=auditory) and explicit task (FITB=fill in the blank, MTS=match to
sample, TF=true/false). We also report the mean number of words per stimulus (‘‘Mean Words’’), the number of stimuli per condition (‘‘N Stimuli Per Cond’’), the Block
length, whether or not the experiment included conditions other than false belief and false photo (‘‘Included Other Conds’’), and the number of participants scanned
with the 32-channel coil on a given localizer (‘‘N 32 Channel’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.t002
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subject, the GLM presumed a binomial distribution and a logit
linker function. The GLM used a normal distribution and an
identity linker function for all other ROI statistics. Regressors,
except the intercept, were mean-centered prior to regression.
Correction for multiple comparisons was performed with Bonfer-
roni correction for the nuisance predictors, across all predictors
(age, gender, etc.) and all dependent measures (mean T, number of
voxels, etc.), within each ROI, as detailed below. With the
exception of the beta values that relate the predictors to the
probability of discovery (which is binomial), these beta values
directly relate the size of the effect in parameter units (i.e., mm) per
regressor unit (i.e., years). Given the number of predictors being
used, we evaluated the estimability of the predictors of interest,
particularly the group predictor, using Belsley’s Collinearity test
[31]. The group predictor of interest was never found to exceed
the standard tolerance (a variance decomposition proportion
greater than 0.5 and a condition index greater than 30) established
in the MATLAB collintest function. All predictor/parameter pairs
were found to lie well within tolerance, across all tests.
In addition to the large-sample GLM, three other samples were
considered in turn using an identical procedure, the only variation
being the subset of participants from which the predictor matrix
was constructed (see Table 1, Table 3). These groups were: (1) the
‘Matched’ sample: 27 ASD participants were matched pairwise to
27 NT participants based on gender, age, IQ, coil, stimulus
modality, and task (both ASD and NT participants are drawn
from [21–23]), (2) the ‘ASD only’ sample: an analysis of variability
within participants diagnosed with ASD and (3) the ‘IQ’ sample:
including all 91 participants for whom IQ was collected. In each
sample, all non-degenerate predictors were used (i.e., predictors
whose values were defined in all participants and varied within-
group, see Table 3). Estimability was assessed in the same way as
in the Full sample. Across all tests, only one predictor, for one
parameter, was found to exceed this tolerance: IQ when used to
predict the mean T value of the MMPFC in the IQ sample. Thus,
our predictors of interest were properly estimable in our models.
Because of the very large number of comparisons, we corrected
p values using three different correction factors (m) according to
Bonferroni’s formula, [corrected p]=1-(1-[uncorrected p])
m. For
our key a priori predictors of interest (ASD vs NT in the full
sample and the ‘Matched’ sample, and IQ in the ‘IQ’ sample), we
corrected for the 6 dependent variables (i.e. the ROI parameters)
per ROI, resulting in m=6. The effect of ADOS score was
measured in the ASD-only sample, and since it has two parameters
(a social and a communication score), we used m=12. All of the
remaining predictors were treated as exploratory, so effects of
these predictors are reported as significant corrected for both the
number of dependent variables (6) and the number of nuisance
predictors (9), resulting in m=54 (exploratory predictors are only
considered in the full sample). Any relationship found to be
significant at p,0.01 uncorrected is discussed as a ‘trend,’ though
corrected p-values are always reported for consistency.
In the matched sample, the significance effect of group on the
mean value of each ROI parameter was also measured and
multiple-comparison corrected nonparametrically. The objective
of such nonparametric tests was to select an alpha using an
empirical distribution such that the probability of any parameter
within an ROI being a false positive result was 0.05. To this end,
we permuted the group labeling randomly 25,000 times. In each
permutation, the significance of the difference in means between
the randomly generated groups was measured by a t-test. This
yielded 25,000 p values for each parameter within an ROI. The p
values for that ROI were pooled together and sorted, and the
0.83%tile (i.e., the 5
th %tile divided by 6, the number of
comparisons per ROI) p value was chosen. This p value represents
an empirical threshold such that, for a given ROI, the chances of
obtaining at least one p value less than it for any parameter is 5%.
We also tested whether the groups differed in the variance of any
ROI parameter using a similar strategy, with two important
differences: the p value was calculated based on an Ansari-Bradley
test, a nonparametric two-sample test of equal variances, and the
‘‘found/not found’’ parameter was omitted, since the mean and
variance of a vector of 19s and 09s are directly related by a
deterministic function.
Whole-brain analyses
Whole brain analyses were conducted on the main contrast of
interest (Belief.Photo). To correct for multiple comparisons,
nonparametric whole-brain analysis was performed using SnPM
(http://www.sph.umich.edu/ni-stat/SnPM/), which estimates the
false-positive rate directly from the data. Each test used 3 mm
variance smoothing and 5,000 permutations, with no global
normalization, grand mean scaling, or threshold masking. The
corrected p-value for filtering was 0.05, with an uncorrected T-
value minimum threshold of 3, and a voxel-cluster combining
theta value of 0.5. Voxel-cluster combining was performed jointly
by Fisher, Tippet and Mass voxel-cluster combining functions.
Permutations were repeated for each predictor of interest; all
demographic and experimental predictor variables were included
Table 3. Representation of the analysis methods used in this study.
Sample N Analysis Strategy Predictors Used
Group IQ
ADOS
Comm
ADOS
Soc Age Coil Gender Modality # Stim # Words
Task
Type
Full NT=462
ASD=31
ROI analysis,
Whole brain
X X X XX XX X
Matched NT=27
ASD=27
ROI analysis,
Whole brain
X X X XX XX X
IQ NT=60
ASD=30
ROI analysis X X X X XX XX
ASD ASD=31 ROI analysis XX X X XX XX
This table indicates, for each sample reported in the study, the number of participants from each group included (N), which set of analyses were conducted, and the
predictors used to account for the observed variance (indicated with an ‘X’). The predictors of primary interest, for each analysis, are marked in bold and italicized; the
remaining predictors are treated as exploratory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.t003
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plugin designed to support nuisance regressors (see Table 3).
To look for subtle group differences, we also conducted a
second, more sensitive whole-brain analysis. We used a more
lenient voxel-wise threshold (p,0.001 uncorrected) to correct for
multiple comparisons, and then validated the results using a split-
half analysis. We used data from each participant’s even and odd
runs, separately, to identify clusters showing a group difference
(NT.ASD, or ASD.NT) in the response to Belief.Photo stories.
We identified clusters in either the even or odd run random effects
analyses, and extracted the response in those clusters in the other
half of the data; clusters are reported as significant if the
corresponding group difference was observed in the left out data
at p,0.05 uncorrected.
Results
ROI results
Six functional ROIs (ROIs) from the ToM network were
defined in individual participants, using the contrast Belief.Photo,
consistent with previous literature [4,6]: RTPJ (in 464/493
individual participants, or 94%), LTPJ (87%), PC (91%), DMPFC
(68%), MMPFC (64%), VMPFC (55%) and RSTS (85%). In the
matched sample, ROI definition was successful in both groups:
RTPJ (NT: 96%, ASD: 96%), LTPJ (89%, 82%), PC (82%, 93%),
DMPFC (74%, 70%), MMPFC (48%, 59%), RSTS (93%, 74%).
The goal of this project was to explain individual differences in
the size, magnitude and/or position of brain regions involved in
ToM. Before testing individual differences, however, it was critical
to determine that (i) there was variability in these measures, and (ii)
the differences between participants on these measures are reliable
(i.e. that inter-individual differences do not simply reflect noise in
the measurement). All ROI parameters showed reasonable
variability. The standard deviation of the mean T-value ranged
between 0.5 and 1 across ROIs, and the standard deviation of
ROI size (measured in number of voxels) ranged between 60 and
100 voxels. In order to test whether this variability reflects stable
individual differences, we compared the correlation of ROI
parameters from independent halves of the data from the each
individual to an empirical permutation-based ‘null’ distribution of
these correlations. Both mean T and ROI size were reliable within
individual, compared to variability across participants, for all
ROIs (mean T: all r.0.25, rank.96%; size: all r.0.13,
rank.90%), except VMPFC. Center of mass was somewhat less
reliable: the x position was reliable (rank.90%) for RTPJ, LTPJ
and MMPFC; the y position was reliable for RTPJ, PC, DMPFC,
MMPFC, and RSTS; and the z position was reliable for RTPJ,
DMPFC, VMPFC, and RSTS.
Next we used multivariate GLM analyses to estimate whether
any variance in the size, position or response magnitude of ToM
brain regions is explained by whether an individual has been
diagnosed with ASD.
For the large sample analysis, we compared all of the
participants with ASD (N=31, 26 male) to all of the NT
participants (N=462, 197 male). No parameter of any ROI was
significantly predicted by the group membership (ASD vs. NT) of
the individual (all p.0.22 for all ROIs, see Figure 1, Table 4).
Furthermore, the odds ratio favoring the null hypothesis (no
difference between the distributions) over the alternative hypoth-
esis (a difference between NT and ASD), for all regions and all
parameters was greater than 1.8:1 (Bayes factor, [32]), with two
exceptions: for the mean T in VMPFC (0.8:1) and the probability
of finding RSTS (1.1:1) the odds of the null and alternative
hypotheses were approximately equal. No ASD participant fell
outside of 3 standard deviations of the typical distribution on any
measure for any ROI. The confidence intervals on the coefficient
estimates were quite small, indicating a high degree of confidence
that if any differences exist, those differences are very small. For
instance, if there exists a difference in the mean T value of the
RTPJ voxels between ASD and NT participants, we are 99%
certain this difference is less than a T value of.3 in either direction.
Next we compared participants with ASD to NT participants in
the ‘Matched’ group. Again, we found no significant difference
between participants with ASD and the matched controls on any
ROI parameter (all p.0.24, Table 4). For these comparisons, the
odds ratio favored the null hypothesis over the alternative
hypothesis (i.e. ratio.1.1:1) for all regions and all parameters,
with one exception, the probability of finding activity in the PC
(0.85:1). We also confirmed these results using nonparametric tests
of group differences (which do not assume that the measured
variables are normally distributed and used the null distributions
to establish a corrected alpha). No ROI parameter showed an
effect of group (the closest to significance was p.0.07, against a
corrected threshold of p,0.01). We conducted a similar analysis to
test whether the ASD group showed a more heterogeneous
response (i.e. some participants showing hypo-activation while
others showed hyper-activation). There was no evidence of
increased variance in the ASD group, for any parameter for any
ROI (the closest to significance was p.0.01, against a corrected
threshold of p,0.002).
In the ‘ASD only’ group, we next considered the effect of
ADOS scores (i.e. social and communicative symptom severity).
No significant effects of ASD severity were found. At the level of a
trend (i.e. p,0.01 uncorrected), an individual’s social ADOS score
predicted the position of the RSTS along the STS (along the
anterior-posterior axis), with greater social ADOS scores predict-
ing more anterior RSTS ROIs (t(14)=3.03, p=0.11,
b=4.9764.88 mm/ADOS point).
Finally, the effect of IQ was assessed in the ‘IQ group’. Higher
IQ significantly increased the chances of identifying the PC
(t(83)=2.76, p=0.03, b=0.1060.09), the MMPFC (t(83)=2.88,
p=0.02, b=0.0660.05), and the VMPFC (t(83)=2.74, p=0.04,
b=0.0660.06). Further, higher IQ predicted significantly greater
mean T-value (t(74)=3.35, p=0.008, b=0.0360.02) and size
(t(74)=3.14, p=0.01, b=2.6362.21) of the PC.
As an exploratory analysis, we looked for effects of other
demographic and experimental parameters. We found that gender
and age did not affect any ROI parameter, even at the level of a
trend, nor did the modality of the stimuli.
In the full sample, the variable with the greatest effect was the
choice of coil. The 32-channel coil produced ROIs with
significantly greater mean T-value in all ROIs except VMPFC
(RTPJ: t(455)=7.54, p,0.0001, b=0.5760.20, LTPJ:
t(422)=6.55, p,0.0001, b=0.4960.19, PC: t(437)=6.05,
p,0.0001, b=0. 4660.19, DMPFC: t(328)=3.92, p=0.006,
b=0.2160.14, MMPFC: t(308)=4.50, p,0.0005, b=0.266
0.15, RSTS: t(410)=4.25, p,0.0001, b=0.3660.14). RTPJ and
RSTS were also significantly larger in participants scanned
with the 32-channel coil (RTPJ: t(455)=4.27, p=0.0001,
b=33.68620.42, RSTS: t(410)=4.25, p=0.0016, b=24.856
15.13). All ROIs were numerically, but not significantly, more
likely to be found using the 32-channel coil versus the 12-channel
coil. Coil choice did not affect the center of mass of the ROIs.
A larger number of words per stimulus slightly but significantly
decreased the mean T-value of the RTPJ (t(455)=23.99,
p=0.004, b=20.02060.013). At the level of a trend (i.e.
p,0.01 uncorrected), a similar effect was observed in the LTPJ
(mean T-value: t(422)=23.32, p,0.06, b=20.01760.013; and
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Full Sample
ROI Parameter Beta T value P value Lower CL Upper CL
Degrees
Freedom # NT # ASD
Baye’s
Factor
RTPJ Mean T 0.101 1.030 0.885 20.153 0.356 455 436 28 4.048
# Voxels 17.160 1.679 0.447 29.276 43.595 455 436 28 1.778
X Center 0.463 0.757 0.972 21.120 2.047 455 436 28 5.090
Y Center 0.207 0.316 1.000 21.488 1.903 455 436 28 6.353
Z Center 21.001 21.317 0.715 22.967 0.965 455 436 28 2.955
Found 0.300 0.818 0.960 20.649 1.249 484 462 31 5.089
LTPJ Mean T 0.073 0.723 0.978 20.189 0.335 422 407 24 4.872
# Voxels 12.161 1.272 0.746 212.575 36.897 422 407 24 2.930
X Center 1.091 1.494 0.584 20.799 2.980 422 407 24 2.204
Y Center 20.128 20.191 1.000 21.867 1.611 422 407 24 6.107
Z Center 0.621 0.813 0.961 21.355 2.596 422 407 24 4.569
Found 0.298 1.118 0.841 20.391 0.987 484 462 31 3.872
PC Mean T 0.025 0.255 1.000 20.226 0.276 437 418 28 6.450
# Voxels 2.874 0.270 1.000 224.654 30.401 437 418 28 6.426
X Center 0.128 0.255 1.000 21.175 1.432 437 418 28 6.450
Y Center 20.523 20.852 0.951 22.109 1.064 437 418 28 4.731
Z Center 0.965 1.053 0.875 21.407 3.338 437 418 28 3.956
Found 20.065 20.188 1.000 20.956 0.826 484 462 31 6.859
DMPFC Mean T 0.097 1.371 0.675 20.086 0.281 328 316 21 2.453
# Voxels 6.730 0.871 0.945 213.291 26.752 328 316 21 4.106
X Center 0.116 0.126 1.000 22.277 2.509 328 316 21 5.779
Y Center 0.096 0.167 1.000 21.394 1.586 328 316 21 5.747
Z Center 20.982 21.430 0.633 22.762 0.797 328 316 21 2.272
Found 20.092 20.418 0.999 20.658 0.475 484 462 31 6.423
MMPFC Mean T 0.120 1.509 0.572 20.086 0.327 308 299 18 1.931
# Voxels 13.463 1.504 0.578 29.745 36.672 308 299 18 1.945
X Center 20.140 20.172 1.000 22.255 1.975 308 299 18 5.368
Y Center 20.112 20.170 1.000 21.830 1.605 308 299 18 5.369
Z Center 0.117 0.175 1.000 21.612 1.845 308 299 18 5.365
Found 0.084 0.398 0.999 20.460 0.627 484 462 31 6.473
VMPFC Mean T 0.148 2.056 0.222 20.039 0.335 260 251 18 0.794
# Voxels 13.533 1.643 0.476 27.840 34.905 260 251 18 1.588
X Center 20.308 20.707 0.980 21.440 0.823 260 251 18 4.313
Y Center 20.056 20.085 1.000 21.749 1.638 260 251 18 5.396
Z Center 20.651 20.959 0.916 22.414 1.111 260 251 18 3.564
Found 20.032 20.157 1.000 20.566 0.502 484 462 31 6.894
RSTS Mean T 0.064 0.851 0.951 20.130 0.257 410 397 22 4.277
# Voxels 7.437 0.941 0.922 213.009 27.883 410 397 22 3.969
X Center 20.535 20.688 0.983 22.548 1.478 410 397 22 4.802
Y Center 2.894 1.433 0.631 22.333 8.121 410 397 22 2.316
Z Center 21.609 21.217 0.782 25.030 1.812 410 397 22 3.014
Found 0.476 1.977 0.256 20.147 1.099 484 462 31 1.108
Matched Sample
ROI Parameter Beta T value P value Lower CL Upper CL Degrees
Freedom
# NT # ASD Baye’s
Factor
RTPJ Mean T 0.098 0.842 0.955 20.215 0.412 44 26 26 3.511
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results pertaining to the mean number of words per stimulus come
with a caveat. One version of the ToM task (localizer B, see
Table 1) had substantially more words per stimulus than any other
version (58 vs 31); Localizer B was also the only version that used a
Table 4. Cont.
Full Sample
ROI Parameter Beta T value P value Lower CL Upper CL
Degrees
Freedom # NT # ASD
Baye’s
Factor
# Voxels 2.261 0.194 1.000 229.165 33.687 44 26 26 4.746
X Center 0.335 0.348 1.000 22.257 2.927 44 26 26 4.570
Y Center 0.878 0.917 0.934 21.700 3.456 44 26 26 3.310
Z Center 20.906 20.939 0.927 23.502 1.691 44 26 26 3.251
Found 20.282 20.346 1.000 22.469 1.906 46 27 27 4.650
LTPJ Mean T 0.036 0.312 1.000 20.281 0.354 38 24 22 4.375
# Voxels 22.482 20.232 1.000 231.513 26.549 38 24 22 4.461
X Center 1.391 1.318 0.728 21.470 4.252 38 24 22 2.129
Y Center 0.328 0.349 1.000 22.219 2.875 38 24 22 4.327
Z Center 20.754 20.723 0.979 23.585 2.077 38 24 22 3.623
Found 0.220 0.498 0.997 20.968 1.409 46 27 27 4.387
PC Mean T 0.073 0.500 0.997 20.322 0.469 39 22 25 4.121
# Voxels 21.212 20.080 1.000 242.268 39.843 39 22 25 4.595
X Center 0.942 1.351 0.707 20.946 2.831 39 22 25 2.064
Y Center 20.198 20.238 1.000 22.459 2.062 39 22 25 4.493
Z Center 0.293 0.201 1.000 23.646 4.232 39 22 25 4.525
Found 21.348 22.000 0.246 23.159 0.463 46 27 27 0.849
DMPFC Mean T 0.113 1.194 0.809 20.146 0.372 31 20 19 2.294
# Voxels 14.279 1.022 0.896 224.041 52.598 31 20 19 2.701
X Center 0.346 0.341 1.000 22.439 3.131 31 20 19 4.044
Y Center 20.086 20.107 1.000 22.280 2.108 31 20 19 4.235
Z Center 20.994 21.065 0.877 23.554 1.566 31 20 19 1.949
Found 20.002 20.005 1.000 20.900 0.897 46 27 27 4.908
MMPFC Mean T 0.141 1.685 0.493 20.096 0.378 21 13 16 1.171
# Voxels 14.182 1.201 0.812 219.258 47.621 21 13 16 2.049
X Center 0.641 0.483 0.998 23.120 4.403 21 13 16 3.389
Y Center 0.067 0.068 1.000 22.736 2.871 21 13 16 3.735
Z Center 20.549 20.487 0.997 23.738 2.641 21 13 16 3.383
Found 20.180 20.617 0.990 20.964 0.604 46 27 27 4.134
VMPFC Mean T 0.145 1.659 0.500 20.097 0.386 27 19 16 1.272
# Voxels 14.575 1.530 0.590 211.818 40.967 27 19 16 1.506
X Center 21.045 21.712 0.461 22.737 0.647 27 19 16 1.184
Y Center 20.392 20.361 1.000 23.396 2.613 27 19 16 3.830
Z Center 20.994 21.029 0.894 23.671 1.682 27 19 16 2.571
Found 0.241 0.733 0.976 20.641 1.122 46 27 27 3.851
RSTS Mean T 0.036 0.513 0.997 20.155 0.227 37 25 20 4.007
# Voxels 0.590 0.063 1.000 224.973 26.154 37 25 20 4.497
X Center 0.182 0.165 1.000 22.818 3.182 37 25 20 4.451
Y Center 1.453 0.530 0.996 25.985 8.890 37 25 20 3.976
Z Center 20.564 20.311 1.000 25.493 4.365 37 25 20 4.316
Found 0.740 1.556 0.536 20.538 2.017 46 27 27 1.675
For each ROI/parameter pair, the effect of group membership was measured via a GLM. The estimated beta value, the t2 and p- values, the 99% confidence intervals,
and the number of NT and ASD individuals included in the regression are reported. Also reported is the Baye’s factor, which relates the odds ratio of the null hypothesis
(group membership has no effect) to the alternate hypothesis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.t004
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length, task, or the specific stimuli used in this experiment.
The number of stimuli per condition did not predict any ROI
parameter significantly. At the level of a trend, the VMPFC
tended to have fewer voxels as the number of stimuli increased
(t(260)= 22.62, p=0.4, b=24.1364.10).
In sum, ROI analyses suggest that while individuals differ
reliably in the size and response magnitude (and to a lesser extent,
position) of brain regions associated with ToM, these neural
parameters were not affected by whether an individual was
diagnosed with ASD. Within the range of ADOS scores in the
current sample, autism severity did not explain variance in these
ROI parameters, either. Only experimental parameters, such as
the MRI coil used, and demographic variables, such as IQ,
explained some of the variance across participants. However, ROI
analyses inevitably provide a limited window on the brain, so to
look further for differences between groups in ToM brain regions,
we conducted whole brain analyses.
Whole brain analysis results
In the whole-brain analyses, the main effect identifies brain
regions significantly recruited during Belief compared to Photo
stories, controlling for variance explained by any of the nuisance
regressors. This analysis identified robust activation in all of the
regions previously associated with Theory of Mind, including
bilateral TPJ, medial precuneus and posterior cingulate, MPFC,
and STS (see Figure 2, Table 5). It also identified activation in
other regions, including (bilaterally) the hippocampus, the
Figure 1. Histograms of ROI mean T-values for six Theory-of-Mind ROIs individually defined in each participant. The T-values are from
the Belief.Photo contrast in each participant. The minimum T-value for defining an ROI was 3. Blue bars show NT participants while green squares
show individual ASD participants. Insets show individually defined ROI for a representative participant. The regions shown are: (top left) right
temporoparietal junction, (top right) left temporoparietal junction, (middle left) precuneus, (middle right) dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, (bottom
left) ventral medial prefrontal cortex, and (bottom right) right anterior superior temporal sulcus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.g001
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the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Next, we compared activation in individuals with ASD vs NT
adults, in both the Matched and Full sample. There were no
significant differences in activation, when correcting for multiple
comparisons. We then repeated the whole brain analysis in the
Full sample using a lenient threshold (p,0.001 voxel-wise,
uncorrected) in half of the data, and validated the results in the
remaining half (p,0.05). Two clusters were identified by the
contrast NT.ASD 6 Belief.Photo: one in left anterior IPS (14
voxels, peak at [232 mm, 240 mm, 40 mm]), and the other in
left posterior IPS (38 voxels, peak at [234 mm 238 mm 42 mm]).
The anterior IPS cluster was identified in both odd and even
halves of the data (independent validation in even half:
t(462,31)=3.15, p=0.002), whereas the posterior IPS cluster was
found only in the odd half, but validated in the even half
(t(462,31)=2.16, p=0.03; see Figure 3). In both regions, both
groups showed higher responses to the Photo than the Belief
stories, but ASD participant’s greater activation during the Photo
stories than NT participants. No regions were reliably recruited
more in ASD than in NT individuals, for Belief.Photo.
A variety of other experimental covariates yielded clusters of
activation, although we treat these as exploratory. These are listed
in Table 6.
Discussion
The main question we sought to address in this paper was
whether adults diagnosed with ASD show differences in the
magnitude or location of activations in ToM-associated brain
regions, compared to a large sample of NT participants. In order
to answer this question, we aggregated data across multiple
experiments to produce a large sample of NT individuals (N=462)
and a moderately large sample of high functioning individuals with
ASD (N=31). We tested whether the magnitude of neural
responses to stories about people’s beliefs, versus about physical
representations like photographs, differed between groups either in
targeted regions of interest or in whole brain analyses. These
analyses identified no reliable differences between groups in the
previously identified ToM brain regions. These results suggest that
differences in activation between these groups of participants
during explicit Theory of Mind tasks, if they exist, are very small
and could not be used to diagnose ASD.
Table 5. Table of clusters and peaks identified in the random
effects analysis of the main effect, in the matched sample,
separated by group and sorted by size.
ASD MATCHED
X (mm) Y (mm) Z (mm) T-value # Vox Region
4 254 40 9.11 1445 PC
0 254 34 7.989
2 250 28 7.582
256 256 26 7.76 983 LTPJ
254 266 32 7.459
256 264 24 7.019
58 258 16 8.229 935 RTPJ
62 252 20 7.142
54 252 24 6.049
2 50 22 9.528 570 DMPFC, MMPFC
0 44 48 5.268
212 58 30 4.478
45 8 214 7.662 455 VMPFC
25 8 28 7.485
265 4214 4.878
60 228 26 6.936 414 RSTS
54 222 28 6.06
50 222 210 6.043
262 220 28 7.279 411 LSTS
264 230 24 5.974
256 230 26 5.153
50 12 236 5.675 115 Temporal Pole
48 20 232 5.153
58 6 220 5.135
226 212 5.013 41 Caudate Nucleus
34 26 220 5.386 30 Right Medial Orbital
Gyrus
32 22 218 5.069
NT MATCHED
X (mm) Y (mm) Z (mm) T-value # Vox Region
60 26 212 8.172 2903 RTPJ, RSTS,
Temporal Pole
58 254 16 8.171
64 224 210 8.158
2 256 36 6.371 969 PC
0 260 30 6.34
26 252 46 4.641
258 248 18 7.269 855 LTPJ
256 258 24 6.709
240 258 28 5.426
262 216 24 7.162 660 LSTS
252 212 216 5.683
256 22 210 5.367
26 54 22 5.951 633 DMPFC, MMPFC
6 46 46 5.498
Table 5. Cont.
ASD MATCHED
X (mm) Y (mm) Z (mm) T-value # Vox Region
6 52 20 5.399
45 2 212 5.595 157 VMPFC
24 4 218 5.305
23 2 222 4.269
54 26 22 6.901 62 Right Insula
42 30 218 4.823 36 R. Med. Orbital
Gyrus
The top three peaks are reported for all clusters identified, where a cluster is
defined as a group of at least 30 contiguous suprathreshold (i.e., p,0.001, u.c.)
voxels. ‘Region’ indicates what region(s) were included in that particular cluster
(in some cases, large clusters at this threshold included multiple regions that
could be distinguished in individuals).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.t005
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We used two complementary analysis strategies: ROI analyses
focused on previous identified ToM brain regions are more
sensitive, whereas whole brain analyses look for differences
between groups anywhere in the brain, and therefore are less
restricted. For both kinds of analyses, we conducted two
comparisons. First, we compared the ASD group to the whole
group of NT individuals, using simultaneous nuisance regressors to
control for variance associated with demographic and experimen-
tal differences among participants. Second, we compared the ASD
group to a smaller sample of NT individuals, one-to-one matched
to the ASD group on age, gender, IQ and experimental
parameters. For both comparisons, we found no reliable differ-
ences between groups in the size, response magnitude, or
probability of identifying above-threshold voxels, in any ToM
ROI (see Figure 1).
In addition to the absence of mean differences between the
groups, we found no evidence that even a subset of individuals
with ASD differed significantly from the typical population. The
ROI parameters of individuals with ASD fell squarely within the
distribution of typical values, rarely straying more than 2 SD from
the typical means and never more than 3 SD. We also tested the
hypothesis that the ASD group was more heterogeneous than the
NT group. For example, similar mean activation could mask
differences between the groups if the ASD group included a
bimodal distribution: some individuals showing hypo-activation
while other show hyper-activation. We found no evidence for this
hypothesis, as the variance of the ROI parameters did not differ
significantly across groups in the matched sample.
In the whole brain analyses, permutation-based correction
revealed no significant differences between ASD and NT
individuals, in either the full sample or the matched sample.
Because our results overall suggest a null result–namely, no
difference between groups–we also examined the same analyses at
a more lenient threshold in half of the data (in case true differences
between groups that are just below the threshold for significance),
and then validated in the left-out half. We found two regions of
parietal cortex with reliable effects; however, the group differences
in these regions were in an unpredicted direction. In both regions,
both groups showed more activation during Photo than Belief
stories, but the ASD group showed more activation than the NT
group during Photo stories. Furthermore, these regions were not
near any of the regions implicated in ToM by the overall contrast
of Belief.Photo. While intriguing, differences in these regions
therefore do not seem likely to explain impairments in ToM
typically observed in ASD. We could not identify any region that
both (a) was reliably recruited for Belief more than Photo stories in
462 NT individuals, and (b) showed significantly less, or more,
activation in the same contrast in 31 individuals with ASD.
Effects of other experimental parameters on ToM
activations
Using a similar analysis strategy, we also found that gender does
not affect activity in ToM brain regions; nor do the modality of the
Figure 2. Results of the random effects analysis of the main
effect (Belief.Photo). In blue, regions identified in NT participants
(N=462) as responding to the false belief condition more than the false
photo condition (p,0.001 uncorrected). Results from ASD participants
are in red (p,0.001, shown in purple because of overlap). Data are
overlayed on the MNI template brain. The volume is centered at [0 mm
254 mm 28 mm], showing the LTPJ and RTPJ (visible in the coronal
and axial slices), the PC (in all slices) and the MPFC (in the sagittal slice).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.g002
Figure 3. Clusters identified in a split-half analysis for which
group has a significant effect on the condition difference. Two
clusters, both in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) were found to be reliable
in the split-half analysis. The mean beta, averaged across individuals, for
each condition in each group is shown. pIPS denotes posterior IPS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.g003
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an effect of gender is particularly noteworthy, because the full
sample contained a large number of male and female participants.
Behavioral measures of ToM often reveal an advantage for female
individuals [33,34]; apparently this advantage is not due to
measurable differences in ToM-associated brain region activity as
elicited by the false belief task.
One factor that did have a significant effect on ROI parameters
was the coil used. The 32-channel coil has documented higher
SNR [35]; we found that this difference translated into larger
ROIs that were more likely to be detected in individual
participants. Thus, our results suggest that for individually-defined
ROI analyses, the increased SNR of the 32-channel coil provides a
clear benefit.
Interpreting the current results
With regard to our key null results, the current study has
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the large sample
size provides more power and sensitivity to detect effects where
they exist. In particular, although our sample of ASD individuals
was only moderately large, the very large sample of NT individuals
included gives us very high confidence on the true mean of the
ROI parameters in NT individuals. Finding that the ASD
population mean does not differ from the NT mean is thus strong
evidence that these data cannot be attributed to different
population distributions.
However, these results cannot be interpreted as ruling out any
differences in the neural mechanisms for ToM in individuals with
ASD. One qualification of the current results is that the
parameters measured here (i.e. response magnitude to Belief vs.
Photo stories) provide only a limited measure of a region’s
function. Other measures include the functional connectivity of
each region and within-region spatial pattern of responses [36,37].
Individuals with ASD may differ in these other measures of ToM
region function [14,38]. Indeed using multi-voxel pattern analysis,
we found reliable differences between a subset of these same ASD
and NT individuals in the pattern of activity in ToM regions [21].
A second qualification is that these results apply to a specific
functional task: an explicit, verbal false belief task. It may be that
deficits in theory of mind in individuals with ASD disproportion-
ately affect implicit or spontaneous consideration of others’ mental
states, but not performance on explicit tasks [39]. fMRI studies
using tasks that elicit spontaneous or implicit social processing may
be more likely to find hypo-activation [23,40–42], whereas those
with tasks that demand explicit social judgments find normal or
hyper-activation [19]. For example, spontaneous processing of
irony may produce hypo-activation in ASD [43], whereas explicit
instructions eliminate the hypo-activation, and may even cause
hyper-activation [19].
Finally, a third qualification is that the ASD participants in the
current sample are very high functioning. Although they meet
clinical diagnostic criteria for ASD (and have been shown to have
behavioral deficits in ToM tasks in a previous study [22]), these
individuals are highly verbal and pass first-order false belief tasks.
Thus, our results do not rule out gross differences in the ToM
regions of lower-functioning individuals with ASD. On the other
hand, the individuals in our sample are diagnosed with ASD
because of disproportionate difficulties with social interaction and
communication. Also, we found no evidence that within our
participants increasing ASD severity had any effect on the
measured ROI parameters. So the current results imply that
social cognitive impairments can occur without measurable
changes in the magnitude or position of ToM brain regions.
Collectively, the current results provide strong evidence that the
neural differences between high functioning adults with ASD and
NT participants are not due to gross changes in ToM brain
regions.
A common hypothesis is that the lack of performance
differences between NT and high-functioning ASD individuals is
a function of the development of compensatory processes in the
ASD individuals. Our findings provide evidence against this
hypothesis. Compensation predicts that successful performance on
explicit ToM tasks would be supported by activity in other regions
than (or in addition to) ToM regions. For example, one possible
prediction might be that individuals with ASD pass false belief
tasks by recruiting the mechanisms that NT individuals used to
Table 6. Other clusters identified (Corrected). X, Y, and Z
coordinates are mm, in MNI Space. A (2) indicates clusters
that correlate negatively with the covariate.
Contrast X (mm) Y (mm) Z (mm) Nvox Peak T
Age 25 223 20 1111 5.58
244 22 4 533 4.39
Age (2)0 257 47 296 4.44
12 ch .32 ch 43 43 21 379 6.23
38 50 26 223 4.90
242 37 23 214 4.36
258 243 218 168 4.92
60 10 9 117 5.10
34 248 65 97 4.69
32 ch .12 ch 0 57 16 1821 19.64
250 268 24 340 4.58
57 4 220 303 4.68
52 30 2 302 4.57
76 1222 16 4.95
Male.Female 241 32 219 115 4.70
# Words/Stim 239 42 15 1455 6.62
254 239 45 614 6.61
21 39 13 486 5.14
251 254 212 171 4.94
45 39 10 158 4.84
# Words/Stim (2) 22 280 11 3923 5.84
51 8 230 487 5.18
252 6 229 444 5.34
258 27 220 332 4.60
57 25 220 319 5.75
258 213 29 251 4.94
250 267 38 173 4.90
214 254 7 163 4.72
30 288 239 65 4.65
215 57 38 30 12.64
# Stim 0 225 28 202 4.58
# Stim (2) 256 254 10 264 4.64
47 274 28 228 4.79
Auditory.Visual 60 27 21 335 5.09
Visual.Auditory 220 279 21 378 4.18
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075468.t006
ASD and Theory of Mind Activation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 11 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e75468solve the logically similar ‘False Photograph’ tasks, such as the
fronto-parietal network [44,45]. By contrast to these predictions,
we found no sign of any increased compensatory activation during
Belief stories, in ASD compared to NT individuals, in any region.
These results leave open a number of key questions. First, it will
be important to identify the neural differences between adults with
ASD and NT individuals that do account for behavioral
differences in ToM. One possibility is that individuals with ASD
are highly heterogeneous, so that different neural sources explain
the behavioral delays in different individuals. As noted above,
though, we do not see evidence for this possibility in the current
data. Another possibility, also discussed above, is that the
difficulties in theory of mind processing are related to the online
use of these regions in real-world social interactions. It will be
important to determine what social contexts lead to atypical as
well as typical recruitment of these brain regions in ASD. Perhaps
ToM brain regions can be recruited during explicit tasks but
atypical interaction with other brain regions and networks results
in hypoactivation during implicit tasks. Third, the current study
focused on adults. It will be important in future research to test
whether the developmental trajectory of ToM brain regions differs
in children with ASD compared to NT children, even if the
mature states of the system are reasonably similar. Finally, it would
be useful to extend these analyses to lower-functioning individuals
with ASD.
Nevertheless, the implications of this study are that (i) social-
cognitive impairments can occur without large differences in the
activation of ToM brain regions; and (ii) hypo-activation during
explicit Theory of Mind tasks will not be useful for diagnosing
ASD.
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